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G.: Mines and Minerals--Merger of Coal Lease in Reversion to Minerals
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
due to the consideration given for the license and the contemplated
expenditures made in reliance thereon.7 It is of greater dignity
than a bare license and is regarded as an equitable easement.8
The court in the principal case properly held that there was
a bare license to erect the sign and not a equitable easement, for
otherwise the licensee would be getting something for nothing, as
there is no showing that the rent was consideration for the contract
to give the license. The question as to whether it is a bare license
or an equitable easement is largely one of policy and is not based
solely on logic.9 There is no fraud in allowing one to make expenditures which the licensor has the right to assume are made in
contemplation of the instability of the license.1° To make the permission irrevocable there must be both a clear intent to create a
permanent incorporeal interest and due formality."
There seems
to be no injustice in placing the loss on a licensee who is careless
enough to expend his money without getting an irrevocable legal
12

right.

W. J. C.
M=nEs AND MINERALS

-

IERGER OF COAL LEASE IN REVERSION

TO MxNERiAis - HousEs As TRADE FIXTURES UNDER COAL LEASE. -L,owner of land and minerals, leased to T the underlying coal. L's
title to the surface passed to A and L's ownership of the reversion
in the coal passed to B. T meantime in the exercise of his mining
rights, and in the use of his way of necessity, erected a large number of miner's houses. Later T became insolvent and ceased mining
operations. The miner's houses were vacated and fell into serious
disrepair. B, as mineral reversioner bought in T's outstanding
mineral lease at a subsequent bankruptcy sale. Sometime later A,
as surface owner, took possession of the houses, the way of necessity
not being then in use, made extensive improvements and rented
the houses to new occupants. B filed a bill for an accounting of
the rentals. Held, that he as owner of the coal was not entitled
to any share. Millard v. Stepp.'
7 Carpenter v. Stapleton, 169 Va. 22, 192 S. B. 792 (1937) ; Sanford v. First
City Co., 118 W. Va. 713, 192 S. E. 337 (1937).
s Carpenter v. Stapleton, Brown v. Western Maryland Ry., both s-pra n. 5.
9 Pifer v. Brown, 43 W. Va. 412, 27 S. E. 399 (1897) ; CLAx, op. oit. supra
n. 2, at 19.
lo Note (1900) 49 L. R. A. 526.
11 The mere fact a deel is used does hot in and of itself create an easement.
Lehigh & N. E. B. R. v. Bangor & P. Ry., 228 Pa. 350, 77 At. 552 (1910).
12 Pifer v. Brown, 43 W. Va. 412, 27 S..E. 399 (1897).
15

S. E. (2d) 815 (W. Va. 1939).
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Immediately upon the sale of any estate in the minerals,
whether for a term of years or in fee, the subsurface operator
becomes entitled to a way of necessity, - to the use of the surface
in exploiting the coal. 2 These mining rights are usually regulated by agreement between the parties. In accordance with such
an agreement T erected the houses. It is well to note that these
houses were not really trade fixtures in the normal sense of the
term because there was no landlord tenant relation but only the exercise of an easement by way of necessity.3 An operator, however,
may make any use he wants to of his improvements' so long as
he does not seriously injure the surface by removal.' The West
Virginia precedents as to the removal of trade fixtures cannot apply
where the fee in the coal is outstanding.' In theory the buildings
may be put up, used and taken away as long as the way of necessity
exists. If the coal veins are completely worked out obviously the
houses cannot be left on the land indefinitely. In any event it
would seem that the mineral owner keeps title to the buildings until
he chooses voluntarily to waive this right in favor of the surface
owner.
In the present case B as mineral reversioner bought out T's
term in the coal. When the owner of the reversion in fee bought in
the term for years, at common law, irrespective of intent of -the
parties there was immediately a merger by which the term was
drowned in the reversion.7 The common law doctrine of merger
is a fixed rule of property law and has nothing to do with intent.8
In recent decades equity principles have made certain inroads on
the doctrine of merger, so that today as regards merger of equit2 McGraw v. Lakin, 67 W. Va. 385, 68 S. E. 27 (1910); Armstrong v. Mary-,
land Coal Co., 67 W. Va. 589, 69 S. E. 195 (1910); Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W.
Va. 307, 121 S. E. 90 (1924); Scott v. Moore, 98 Va. 668, 37 S. E. 342 (1900).
3 Shaleen v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 127 Ark. 397, 192 S. W. 225 (1917).
4Lessee under coal lease could build houses for future use of its employees
and pending such use, lease the buildings to another company without accounting to the lessors for the rents. Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Kelly & Vicars,
115 Va. 390, 79 S. E. 341 (1913).
G (1926) 40 C. J. 1016, § 621(2); Couch v. Welsh, 24 Utah 36, 66 Pac. 600

(1901).

a The case of Gartland v. Hickman, 56 W. Va. 75, 49 S. E. 14, 67 L. R. A.
694 (1904), which says that trade fi.xtures put on land under an oil and gas
lease must be removed before the term expires or within a reasonable time thereafter, however, will not apply in this case since the fee in the coal is outstand-

ing and the way of necessity is still in existence.

7 Notes (1915) 9 R. C. L. 808, §' 64; (1920) 19 C. J. 945, § 156; Kerns v.
Carr, 82 NV. Va. 78, 95 S. E. 606 (1918); Turk v. Skiles, 45 W. Va. 82, 30 S.

E. 234 (1898).

8 Larmon v. Larmon, 173 Ky. 477, 191 S. W. 110 (1917); Forthman v.
Deters, 206 Dl. 159, 69 N. E. 97, 99 Am. St. Rep. 145 and note (1903).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol46/iss3/10

2

G.: Mines and Minerals--Merger of Coal Lease in Reversion to Minerals
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
able interests, the smaller is not necessarily drowned in the greater.
In short equity looks to the actual or presumed intent of the
parties.9 For instance, there is no merger of an equitable life estate
and a legal contingent remainder." Again, where the legal ownership of land and the absolute ownership of an encumbrance or
charge become vested in the same person, there is no merger in
equity." Since, however, no equitable interests were involved both
the trial court and the appellate court were sound in holding that,
following the bankruptcy sale, T's lease was lost in B's fee. It
would thus seem that all of the incidents of T's way of necessity,
which had been defined in terms of mineral rights, were absorbed
into B's common law way of necessity, as mineral owner. Naturally the disappearance of T's privilege to use the surface in no way
precludes B's ownership of the houses since B purchased at the
bankruptcy sale all the leasehold property including, one would
think, the right of Eeverance. At least B's way of necessity as regards the use and removal of the old houses or the erection, use and
removal of new ones, should be no less than T's former easement by
way of necessity, so long as there is minable coal and reasonable
prospect of future development.
Assuming that these houses were removable fixtures arising out
of use of a way of necessity and assuming further that B succeeded
to the rights under the original mineral lease, either by the bankruptcy assignment or by B's own common law way of necessity, these
assumptions do not dispose of the issues in this case. In the present
suit for an accounting in equity the trial chancellor must decide this
quasi-contractual claim on its intrinsic merits, having regard to
all the facts in the case. The evidence here indicated that most
of the houses had been unoccupied for years, and that the mineral
owners were completely indifferent to their injury or destruction.
From all appearances B was willing to have these buildings continue to deteriorate until they became worthless.12 Furthermore
the surface owner, A, entered into possession to prevent further
ruin of the houses and expended a great deal of time and considerable money in repair and renovation. In these circumstances no
9 2 POMFEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 786-788.

-0 Higgins v. Washburn, 11 Cal. App. 735, 106 Pae. 415 (1910); Scott v.
Fairlie, 81 la. 438, 89 So. 128 (1921).
" Agnew v. Charlotte, etc. R. R., 24 S. C. 18 (1884) ; Wiedemann v. Crawford,
1582 Ky. 657, 166 S. E. 185 (1914).
These facts appear in the record, though they are not mentioned in the
opinion.
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doubt it seemed thoroughly inequitable to the trial chancellor that
B should now claim a right in the rents.
The appellate court here wisely refrained from determining the
extent of B's surface rights, including the use of the houses in question, if and when further development of the coal takes place.
J. L. G. JR.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-

DEATH BENEFIT AWARDS

TO

PARTIAL AND TOTAL DEPENDENTS. - X was fatally injured while
at work for the Y company, a subscriber to the workmen's compensation fund. X's widow, separated from him for several years,
was not dependent. The commissioner awarded benefits to X's
dependent child but denied benefits to X's partially dependent
mother. The appeal board reversed the commissioner's order denying benefits to X's partially dependent mother. Held, two judges
dissenting, that it is within the sound discretion of the commissioner to make an award to a partially dependent mother, though
there is also an award to a dependent child. Hudson v. State
2
Compensation Commissioner.
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides, "If the deceased
employee be an adult and there be no dependent widow, widower or
child under sixteen years of age, or wholly dependent person, but
there are partly dependent persons at the time of death, the payment shall be... 3 A succeeding section reads, "The benefits, in
case of death, shall be paid to such one or more dependents of the
decedent.., as may be determined by the commissioner.... Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be made if the commissioner deems proper ... ' '*
The latter provision modifies the meaning of the prior provision and gives the commissioner a discretion in awarding death
benefits, because, by the generally accepted rule of construction, if
different parts or sections of the same statute are found to be in
irreconcilable conflict, the last in order of position or arrangement
will prevail.5 This view finds support in a California case8 giving
1 It is noted that the compensation commissioner appealed
the appeal board.
25 S. E. (2d) 108 (W. Va. 1939).
3W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 23, art. 4, § 10 (f).
4W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 23, art. 4, § 11.
5 Board of Education v. Tyler County Court, 77 W. Va.
(1916); Speidel Grocery Co. v. Warder, 56 W. Va. 602, 49
Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Tax Com'r, 59 W. Va. 605, 53

from the ruling of

523, 87 S. B. 870
S. E. 534 (1904);
S. E. 928 (1905);

BLACK, CoNsTRucToN & INTERPREATiox OF LAWS (2d ed. 1911) 102.
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